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WHEN A JURY ISN’T THE FINAL WORD: Matusak v. Daminski and the Reach of Qualified Immunity

  • Apr 20
  • 4 min read

Monday, April 20, 2026

By: Robert D. Bannister, Esq. | Associate


A jury found that two Monroe County sheriff’s deputies used excessive force and awarded $200,000 in compensatory damages. Yet the plaintiff ultimately recovered nothing.

 

That outcome—affirmed by the Second Circuit on January 29, 2026, in Matusak v. Daminski, 165 F.4th 702—offers a striking illustration of how qualified immunity can override a jury verdict in § 1983 excessive force litigation. For defense counsel, municipalities, and law enforcement agencies, the decision warrants careful attention.

 

THE FACTS

 

In the early morning hours of February 1, 2018, Christopher Matusak fled from a Monroe County sheriff’s deputy into a dark, snowy wooded area in Scottsville, New York. He later admitted he was attempting to evade a DWI arrest.

 

After a foot pursuit, deputies used fist and knee strikes, pepper spray, and a taser before securing him in handcuffs. Matusak was hospitalized; the only officer injured sustained hand pain and swelling.

 

Matusak brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Following a jury trial in the Western District of New York, the jury returned a mixed verdict:

 

·         No excessive force by Deputy Daminski

·         Excessive force by Deputy Murphy and Sergeant Unterborn

·         $200,000 in compensatory damages

·         No punitive damages

 

However, based on the jury’s answers to special interrogatories, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law, holding that Murphy and Unterborn were entitled to qualified immunity. The Second Circuit affirmed.

 

Qualified Immunity Framework

 

Qualified immunity shields officers unless:

·         They violated a constitutional right; and

·         That right was clearly established at the time.

 

Here, the first prong was not at issue. The officers did not challenge the jury’s finding of excessive force. The entire appeal turned on the second prong—whether clearly established law in February 2018 would have put every reasonable officer on notice that the conduct was unlawful.

 

The Second Circuit held that it would not.

 

The Role of Special Interrogatories

 

A key procedural feature of the case was the use of special interrogatories to resolve factual disputes relevant to qualified immunity.

 

Because qualified immunity is a legal question informed by specific facts, the district court asked the jury targeted questions, including:

 

·         Was Matusak resisting?

·         Did he actually pose a threat?

·         Did officers reasonably believe he posed a threat?

 

The jury found:

 

·         Matusak did not actually pose a threat

·         But officers reasonably believed he did

·         Matusak was resisting attempts to extract his arms for handcuffing at each use of force

 

These findings were binding on the court and became the foundation for the qualified immunity ruling.

 

Why Qualified Immunity Applied

 

The Second Circuit acknowledged a well-established principle: officers may not use significant force against a non-resistant, non-threatening suspect. Cases such as Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2010) Soto v. Gaudett, 862 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2017) and Rogoz v. City of Hartford, 796 F.3d 236, 248 (2d Cir. 2015) clearly establish that rule. But the court emphasized that this case involved materially different facts.

 

1. Resistance

 

The jury found that Matusak resisted by keeping his hands underneath his body and preventing officers from handcuffing him. The court declined to classify this as merely “passive” resistance and noted that, as of 2018, Second Circuit law did not clearly distinguish between active and passive resistance for qualified immunity purposes.

 

2. Reasonable (but Mistaken) Belief of Threat

 

Even though Matusak did not actually pose a threat, the jury found the officers reasonably believed he did, based on:

 

·         A nighttime pursuit into a wooded area

·         Radio communications suggesting a struggle

·         A period of radio silence from the initial officer

·         Matusak’s concealed hands and continued resistance

 

The Second Circuit emphasized that qualified immunity protects reasonable mistakes of fact—not just mistakes of law.

 

The Absence of Clearly Established Law

 

            Given those facts, “there was no clearly established law that would fairly warn police officers that a taser could not be used against a resisting arrestee.” Matusak, 165 F.4th 702, 718 (2d Cir. 2026) (quoting Jones v. Treubig, 963 F.3d 214, 228 (2d Cir. 2020).

 

The court also relied on Brown v. City of New York, 862 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2017) where qualified immunity applied when officers used force to extract a suspect’s hands for handcuffing—even absent an actual threat.

 

Importantly, the court rejected several plaintiff arguments:

 

·         General proportionality principles (Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)) were too abstract

·         No clearly established rule required officers to wait a specific amount of time for compliance

·         No clearly established distinction between active vs. passive resistance controlled the outcome

 

Practical Takeaways

 

• Special interrogatories are outcome-determinative tools This case underscores how carefully crafted jury questions can preserve the factual findings necessary to support qualified immunity post-verdict.

 

• Reasonable mistakes of fact matter Qualified immunity protects officers who are wrong—so long as their mistake is objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

 

• “Clearly established” means fact-specific Broad principles (e.g., force must be proportional) are insufficient. Courts require precedent that squarely governs the specific situation.

 

• Resistance remains a critical variable Even non-violent resistance—such as withholding hands during handcuffing—can materially affect the qualified immunity analysis.

 

  

Conclusion

 

Matusak v. Daminski demonstrates that even a successful jury verdict on excessive force does not end the case. Where officers act in a legally uncertain environment—particularly involving resistance and perceived threats—qualified immunity can still bar recovery entirely.

 

For municipalities and defense counsel, the decision highlights both a powerful defense and a critical litigation strategy: build the record, frame the facts, and let the jury answer the questions that matter.

 

Kenney Shelton Liptak Nowak LLP regularly advises municipalities, law enforcement agencies, and their insurers on § 1983 civil rights litigation, qualified immunity defenses, and related.

 

Matters. For questions about how this decision may affect pending or future matters, contact our civil litigation team.

 
 
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